In this paper we consider the secure transmission with multiple-input, single-output, single-antenna eavesdropper (MISOSE) in fast fading channels where the transmitter knows perfect legitimate channel state information but only the statistics of the eavesdropper's channel. For the MISOSE channels, the artificial noise assisted beamforming proposed by Goel and Negi is a promising technique, where the artificial noise is imposed on the null space of the legitimate channel to disrupt the eavesdropper's reception. Here we propose a generalized artificial noise scheme which allows the injection of the artificial noise to the legitimate channel. Although the generalized artificial noise may cause the leakage of artificial noise at the legitimate receiver, the secrecy rate can still be improved since the covariance matrix of it is more flexible than the heuristic one selected by Goel and Negi. To fully characterize the proposed scheme, we investigate the optimization of its secrecy rate. We first derive the conditions under which the beamformers of the message bearing signal and the generalized artificial noise being the same is optimal. Based on this choice, the complicated secrecy rate optimization problem over the covariance matrices of the message-bearing signal and the generalized artificial noise can be reduced to a much simpler power allocation problem. We also develop an efficient algorithm to solve this non-convex power allocation problem. Numerical results show that our generalized artificial noise scheme outperforms Goel and Negi's heuristic selection, especially in the near eavesdropper settings. In particular, with the aid of the proposed scheme, the regime with non-zero secrecy rate is enlarged, which can significantly improve the connectivity of the network.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T RADITIONALLY, the security of data transmission has been ensured by the key-based enciphering. However, for secure communication in large-scale wireless networks, Manuscript received September 17, 2012; revised March 10, 2013. The material in this paper was presented in part at the 22nd IEEE Symposium on Personal, Indoor, Mobile and Radio Communications (PIMRC 2011 the key distributions and managements may be challenging tasks [1] [2] . The physical-layer security, introduced in [3] [4] , is appealing since this technique does not require key to ensure secrecy. One of the fundamental setting for the physical-layer security is the wiretap channel. In this channel, a source node wishes to transmit messages securely to a legitimate receiver and to keep the eavesdropper as ignorant of the message as possible. Wyner first characterized the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel [3] . The secrecy capacity is the largest rate communicated between the source and legitimate receiver with the eavesdropper knowing no information of the messages. Motivated by the demand of high data rate transmission, the multiple antenna systems with security concern were considered by several authors. Shafiee and Ulukus [5] first proved the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian channel with two-input, two-output, singleantenna-eavesdropper. Then the authors of [6] - [8] extended the secrecy capacity result to the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output, multiple-antenna-eavesdropper channel. On the other hand, due to the characteristics of wireless channels, the impacts of fading channels on the secrecy transmission were considered in [9] . Note that the works in [3] , [5] - [10] require full channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT). However, considering practical issues such as the limited bandwidth of the feedback channels or the speed of the channel estimation at the receivers, perfect CSIT may not be available in practice. Therefore, several works considered the secure transmission with partial CSIT [11] - [18] . The artificial noise assisted secure beamforming is a promising technique for the partial CSIT cases, where in addition to the messagebearing signal, an artificial noise is intentionally transmitted to disrupt the eavesdropper's reception [11] [12] . In this paper, we consider an important type of wiretap channels with partial CSIT, namely, the multiple-input singleoutput single-antenna-eavesdropper (MISOSE) fast fading wiretap channels. We assume that the transmitter has perfect knowledge of the legitimate channel and only the statistics of the eavesdropper channel. Although the secrecy capacity of the considered channel is unknown, the rate performance of the artificial noise-assisted beamforming has been shown to be capacity-achieving in the high signal to noise ratio (SNR) regime when the transmitter is equipped with a large number of antennas [12] . However, in the regimes of reasonable SNR and number of antennas, the heuristically selected covariance matrix of artificial noise in [11] [12] may not be optimal, where the artificial noise is restricted to be transmitted in the null space of the legitimate channel. This motivates our study on generalizing and optimizing the artificial noise assisted secure beamforming in [11] [12] . 0733-8716/13/$31.00 c 2013 IEEE The main contribution of this paper is to propose a generalized artificial noise-assisted secure beamforming, and optimizing its ergodic secrecy rate. Our scheme is a generalization of those in [11] [12] , and has a better secrecy rate performance according to our numerical simulations. More specifically, the covariance matrix of our generalized artificial noise is more flexible than the ones in [11] [12] , for which the artificial noises are restricted to be transmitted in the null space of the legitimate channel. We further show that the complicated secrecy rate optimization problem over covariance matrices can be reduced to a much simpler power allocation problem. To attain this interesting result, we first prove that the optimal covariance matrix of the message bearing signal is unit rank. Then we identify the structure of the covariance matrix of the generalized artificial noise. Based on these results, we show that the secrecy rate is a function of only three variables, where two of them are related to the covariance matrix of the generalized artificial noise, and the remaining one is related to the covariance matrix of the message-bearing signal. Although our simplified rate optimization problem is a power allocation problem with only three scalar variables, it is a non-convex stochastic optimization problem. We develop an algorithm to efficiently solve this problem and provide a criterion to check whether the power allocation found by our algorithm satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions or not. Numerical results confirm that the optimized generalized artificial noise provides rate gains over the heuristic generalized artificial noise in [11] . In particular, the non-zero rate region is enlarged by the generalized artificial noise, especially in the near eavesdropper scenarios. Note that secure connectivity in a network is assured by the non-zero secrecy rates of the transmitterreceiver pairs [2] . Thus our scheme is very useful for the large scale wireless network applications, which constitute an important type of applications of the MISOSE wiretap channels [1] [2] .
In the following we compare our work with related literatures [11] - [18] . Contrary to our results, the covariance matrices of the artificial noises in [11] [12] are selected without optimization. In addition, the power allocation between the message-bearing signal and the artificial noise in [11] is found via full-search, which is much more inefficient than our method. As a special case of our scheme, the works in [17] only solve the power allocation between the message-bearing signal and artificial noise, while the beamforming directions are heuristically selected as in [11] . On the contrary, our beamforming directions are obtained from optimization, and our results further show that the power allocation proposed in [17] may not be optimal, since the power of artificial noise in the signal dimension is forced to be zero in [17] . In [18] the authors proposed two schemes aiming to increase the secrecy rate. However, both are special cases of ours: the first one is exactly the same as that in [17] while the second, similar to [13] , considers secure beamforming without the artificial noise. However, artificial noise is crucial in increasing the secrecy rate in fast fading wiretap channels [11] [12] . Compared to the optimization problems of the second scheme in [17] and that in [13] , our optimization problem which solves the covariance matrices of the message-bearing signal and the artificial noise is much more difficult. In [14] , a single antenna system is considered, and thus there are no beamforming and spatial power allocation optimization problems as in our setting. On the other hand, under channel conditions different to ours, the secrecy capacities for channels with partial CSIT have been found in [15] [16] . In [15] , an ergodic slow faded eavesdropper channel is assumed while our eavesdropper channel is fast faded. And the transmitter in [16] has only statistical CSIT of the legitimate channel while our transmitter has full CSIT of it.
Note that there are some works, such as [19] [20] , which use the minimization of the signal-to-noise-and-interference-ratio (SINR) at the eavesdroppers instead of using the maximization of the perfect secrecy rate as the design criteria. In general, the purpose to use SINR as the design criterion is to approximate the stochastic secrecy rate optimization problem considered in our paper by a simpler deterministic optimization problem. Thus the approximated solutions in [19] [20] do not necessarily optimize the secrecy rate. In fact, the result in [20, (11) ] is inherited from the conventional wisdom [11] [12] , which suggests that artificial noise should not be transmitted in the signal direction. Compared with our results, we know that the approximated solutions obtained by SINR optimization may not be optimal for the secrecy rate defined under the perfect secrecy constraint [3] . Furthermore, constraining SINR at eavesdropper as in [19] [20] may not guarantee that the perfect secrecy constraint is met.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the considered system model. In Section III, we provide the complete derivations to simplify the optimization problem and characterize the optimal covariance matrices of the considered generalized artificial noise. In Section IV, we provide an iterative algorithm to solve the power allocation problem, and a criterion to check the optimality of the power found by the proposed algorithm. In Section V we demonstrate the numerical results. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the MISOSE system, where the transmitter (Alice) has n T antennas and the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve) each has single antenna. The received signals at Bob and Eve can be respectively represented as *
where x k ∈ C n T ×1 is the transmit vector, k is the time index, h is the constant legitimate channel vector, g k ∼ CN(0, I n T ) * In this paper, lower and upper case bold alphabets denote vectors and matrices, respectively. For an n × 1 vector a, a ⊥ denotes a n × (n − 1) matrix whose columns form an orthonormal basis for the null space of a. The ith element of vector a is denoted by a i . a H andā denote the transpose complex conjugate and conjugate of a, respectively. A i, j denotes the entry at the ith row and jth column of A. |A| and |a| represent the determinant of the square matrix A and the absolute value of the scalar variable a, respectively. A diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are a 1 ... a k is denoted by diag{a 1 ... a k }. The trace of A is denoted by tr(A). We define C(x) log(1 + x) and (x) + max{0, x}. The mutual information between two random variables is denoted by I(;). The collections of n random vectors h is denoted by h n . I n denotes the n by n identity matrix. A 0 and A 0 denote that A is a positive definite and positive semi-definite matrix, respectively. Finally, a b denotes that a majorizes b. Also the term "legitimate channel" and "main channel" are exchangeable in this paper.
is the random eavesdropper's channel with complex Gaussian distribution, and n 1,k and n 2,k are circularly symmetric complex additive white Gaussian noises with variances one at Bob and Eve, respectively. In this system, as in [11] [13] [14] , we assume that full CSI of the legitimate channel and only the statistics of Eve's channel are known at the transmitter † . Without loss of generality, in the following we omit the time index to simplify the notation. The perfect secrecy and secrecy capacity are defined as follows. Consider a (2 nR , n)-code with an encoder that maps the message w ∈ W = {1, 2,...,2 nR } into a length-n codeword, and a decoder at the legitimate receiver that maps the received sequence y n (the collections of y over code length n) from the MISOSE channel (1) to an estimated messageŵ ∈ W . We have the following definition of secrecy capacity.
Definition 1 (Secrecy Capacity [15] ). Secrecy rate R is achievable if, for any positive ε, there exists a (2 nR , n) code such that the error probability for the secret message w is vanishing and the perfect secrecy constraint I(w; z n , h n , g n )/n < ε is met. The secrecy capacity C s is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates.
From Csiszár and Körner's argument [4] , we know that the secrecy capacity with statistical CSIT of Eve's channel can be represented by
where u is an auxiliary random variable. However, for our considered CSIT setting, where the CSIT is not fully known, the optimal p(x|u) and p(u) are still unknown. We apply the linear channel prefixing and Gaussian signaling to p(x|u) as
where u ∼ CN(0, S u ) and v ∼ CN(0, S v ) are independent vectors to convey the message and generalized artificial noise, respectively. Note that according to the definitions of I(u; z|g) in [21] , this information leakage term is an expectation over the random eavesdropper channel g. Indeed, the secrecy capacity in (3) is achieved by encoding over multiple varying channel states of the ergodic eavesdropper channel. In addition, the feasible channel input covariance matrices of the message-bearing signal and the generalized artificial noise belong to the set (5) where P T is the maximum allowed transmit power. Note that our generalized artificial noise can be transmitted in all directions of the space spanned by h, but the artificial noise in [11] is only allowed to be transmitted in the null space of h. Thus our generalized artificial noise scheme generalizes the artificial noise in [11] . We further denote the eigenvalue decompositions of S u and S v as UD u U H and VD v V H , respectively. † Note that in [11] , the statistics of the eavesdropper's channel are needed for the transmitter to search the power allocation between the signal and the artificial noise (see [11, equation (8)]). Thus our CSIT assumption for the eavesdropper channel is the same as that in [11] , and the comparison with [11] in Section V is fair.
Substituting (1), (2) , and (4) into (3), we have the secrecy rate with generalized artificial noise ‡
Note that in this paper, due to the tractability, we focus on the achievable secrecy rate with Gaussian signaling and Gaussian generalized artificial noise as (6) , which is generally suboptimal compared with the secrecy capacity in (3). Besides Gaussian signaling, one may also use the finite alphabet signaling as in [10] . However, this direction is beyond the scope of our paper. Then we can further transform (6) into the following form to simplify the problem
We will focus on (7) in the rest of the paper. Here we briefly compare our design criterion, the secrecy rate in (7), with the SINR at the eavesdropper used in [19] [20] . First, note that as in our Definition 1, secrecy rate is defined under the constraint that the perfect secrecy constraint I(w; z n , h n , g n )/n < ε is met. However, constraining SINR at eavesdropper as [19] [20] may not guarantee that the perfect secrecy constraint is met. Second, the SINR criterion can be treated as an approximation of the secrecy rate (7) as follows. From (7) , the rate paid for preventing being eavesdropped is
And after applying Jensen's inequality, this term is upperbounded as
Then we can get the SINR constraint at the eavesdropper by the following approximation on the Jensen upper-bound as
where the right-hand side (RHS) equals to the SINR. Due to the approximation error, the solutions obtained in [19] [20] are strictly suboptimal for the secrecy rate optimization. In the following sections, we will solve the secrecy rate optimization problem for the proposed generalized artificial noise assisted beamforming (GAN-BF). ‡ Note that our results can be easily generalized to the case where g ∼ CN(0,σ 2 g I n T ) with σ 2 g = 1. More specifically, one can show that the secrecy rate optimization problem with σ 2 g = 1 can be transformed to an equivalent one with σ 2 g = 1, i.e., the equivalent legitimate channel becomesh = 1 σg h, and the maximum allowed transmit power becomesP T = σ 2 g P T . Then our results are still valid.
III. OPTIMIZATION OF THE SECRECY RATE OF THE GENERALIZED ARTIFICIAL NOISE ASSISTED BEAMFORMING
In this section, we identify the structure of the optimal solutions S * u and S * v for the GAN-BF optimization problem. We first prove that the optimal signaling of message bearing signal is beamforming, i.e., S * u is unit rank. After that, we derive conditions of the optimality of choosing the beamformers of the message bearing signal and the generalized artificial noise to be the same. Then based on the choice, we solve the beamformers. Note that the heuristically selected beamformers in [11] [12] are still special cases of ours even under this choice. By exploiting the structure of optimal S * u and S * v , we transform the complicated optimization problem over the covariance matrices, into a much simpler one in Theorem 3. That is, the secrecy rate of the GAN-BF is characterized by only three scalar variables, i.e., the power of the message bearing signal P U , the power of artificial noise in the signal direction P V s , and the power of artificial noise in the null space of signal direction P V r . Note that in [11] [12], P V s is always zero, which is only a subset of our feasible solution set. Thus the schemes in [11] [12] are suboptimal compared with ours. Contrary to our proposed generalized artificial noise, the authors in [11] [12] directly assume that the artificial noise is only transmitted in the null space of the main channel, such that only the second term on the RHS of (7) affects the optimization problem. Therefore the direction of message bearing signal can be easily observed as parallel to the main channel. However, when the generalized artificial noise is used, both terms on the RHS of (7) need to be considered, which results in a non-convex problem and is much more involved than those considered in [11] [12] .
A. Characteristics of optimal beamformers for the proposed generalized artificial noise scheme
In the following we identify two important properties for the secrecy rate optimization problem (7) . The first is for the rank of the optimal S * u for (7) and the second is for the beamformers of S * u and S * v . Based on these two properties, we can simplify (7) as in Theorem 3, which is provided in the next subsection with the steps to reach it.
Here we first introduce the interlacing theorem in Lemma 1 [22, p.182 ], which will be used in identifying the rank property of the optimal S * u for (7) in upcoming Theorem 1. Lemma 1 (Interlacing Theorem [22] ). For any vector a ∈ C n and Hermitian matrix M ∈ C n×n , we have
where λ k (A) is the kth eigenvalue of A in ascending order.
Now we show that the optimal covariance matrix of the message-bearing signal S * u is unit rank. Note that compared with the results from our special cases in [13] , the generalized artificial noise makes the matrix A * in (34) in Appendix-A more complicated than that in [13] . Thus it is much more difficult to identify the eigenvalues of A * for proving the unit rank property. To solve this problem, we develop new techniques based on the Interlacing Theorem in Lemma 1.
Theorem 1. The optimal covariance matrix of the messagebearing signal S * u for the secrecy rate-optimization problem (7) is unit rank.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Sec. VII-A. Based on the fact that the optimal S u * is unit rank, we then investigate the condition of the optimality that S * u and S * v have the same beamformer, i.e., S * v has one common eigenvector with S u * (the eigenvector of S u * corresponding to the non-zero eigenvalue.) Note that the beamformers U and V in [11] [12] are selected heuristically without any claim of optimality, and are special cases of ours even under the same assumption (even under the choice U = V). In the following we characterize the optimality condition.
Proposition 1. For the secrecy rate optimization problem in (7) , by replacing the constraint S v 0 with S v 0 in (5), the optimal S u and S v commute and have the same eigenvectors U = V. In other words, the only eigenvector u 1 with non-zero eigenvalue of the optimal S u is also an eigenvector of the optimal S v .
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Section VII-B. Following the spirit of [13] , we name the pair (S u , S v ) satisfying the necessary condition
as the KKT solution, which is derived in Section VII-B. Now for the original optimization problem (7) with constraint (5) (S v 0), we argue that the assumption that S u and S v have the same eigenvectors is still reasonable (or even without loss of optimality) due to the following three reasons. First, the necessary condition (9) is still valid for the optimal solution of the original problem with constraint S v 0. And if the optimal S * u and S * v have the same eigenvectors (equal to the eigenvector of B * ), it is obvious that (9) is valid. Second, if the optimal S * v 0 under constraint S v 0, then the results in Proposition 1 apply and our assumption will not lose optimality. Finally, if the optimal S * v under constraint S v 0 does not satisfy S * v 0, i.e., det(S * v ) = 0, as (77) of [8] , we can use a suboptimal solution S * v + αI 0 instead of the optimal S * v , where α > 0. The suboptimal solution S * v + αI 0 meets the setting in Proposition 1 and will have secrecy rate close to the one obtained from the optimal S * v when α → 0. Thus under the assumption that S u and S v have the same eigenvectors, one may still find a close to optimal solution in this case.
And from Proposition 1 we have the following theorem, with the proof given in Section VII-C.
Theorem 2. For the secrecy rate optimization problem in (7) ,
Note that Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 rigorously explore the properties of the eigenvectors of the artificial noise covariance matrix. These analytical results did not appear in the previous literature [11] - [15] , [17] , [18] .
B. Simplified GAN-BF secrecy rate optimization problem
Based on Theorem 1 and 2, we can now simplify the covariance matrix optimization problem (7) as the following power allocation problem.
Theorem 3. For the MISOSE fast fading wiretap channel with perfect information of the legitimate channel h, and only the statistics of the eavesdropper's channel g ∼ CN(0, I n T ) known at the transmitter, with S u = P U hh H /||h|| 2 and S v having the beamformers V = [h/||h||, (h/||h||) ⊥ ], the secrecy rate optimization problem in (7) can be reduced to
with the power constraint set
where P V s , P V r , and P U are the power of the generalized artificial noise in the signal direction, the power of artificial noise in the null space of signal direction, and the power of the message-bearing signal, respectively;G i g i 2 is an exponential random variable with mean equal to 1, for i = 1, 2,... ,n T .
Proof: First, we prove that for GAN-BF, the power constraint in (5) holds with equality to optimize (7) . From
whereG i g i 2 , and P U +
Note that for any P U and P V 1 , the term log 1 (12) is independent of the powers P V 2 ,... ,P V n T . Thus for any fixed P U and P V 1 , the maximization over P V 2 ,... ,P V n T in (12) is equivalent to
subject to the power constraint
Observing the denominator of (13), we can find that with fixed P U and P V 1 , the optimal solution always happens when the equality in (14) holds sinceG i ≥ 0. Now we can find the covariance matrix for the generalized artificial noise as the following Lemma 2, with proof given in AppendixVII-D. Note that in Lemma 2, the noise power in the signal direction may not always equal to zero, and the scheme in [11] may perform worse than ours. The key to prove Lemma 2 is by identifying the complete monotone property of the secrecy rate in (7) from the stochastic ordering theory [23] . This proof is new and did not appear in [11] [13] .
Lemma 2. For the secrecy rate-optimization problem of the GAN-BF in (7) , with S u = P U hh H /||h|| 2 and S v having the beamformers V = [h/||h||, (h/||h||) ⊥ ], the optimal covariance matrix of the generalized artificial noise is
where P * V s and P * V r are the optimal powers of the artificial noise in the directions parallel and orthogonal to the messagebearing signal, respectively, and P * U is the optimal power of message-bearing signal, satisfying
Now Theorem 3 can be proved. The power constraints (11) come from (15) . Also after substituting S * u = P * U hh H ||h|| 2 , and S * v from Lemma 2 into (7), we can get (10) . Comparing (7) to (10) we can easily find that the optimization problem is vastly simplified from solving two matrices to solving three scalar variables. And we will develop an algorithm in the next section to find these optimal power allocation. As a final note, when the legitimate channel is also fast fading but perfectly known at transmitter, the achievable secrecy rate for this setting can be easily obtained from our results in Theorem 3 and follows the statement in [14] .
Remark: Note that in the proof of Theorem 3, we show that the optimal power allocation always happens when the sum power constraint in (5) is met with equality as in (11) . This fact is not trivial for the wiretap channel since when the transmit power increases, both the SNRs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper increase. Then the secrecy rate may not always increase with increasing transmit power. Counter examples are given [10] [14] . Indeed, the monotonically increasing property for secrecy rate (with respect to the transmit power) was also examined in [13, Sec V]. As described in the Remark of [13, P.1181], whether the monotonically increasing properties are valid or not in some general cases are still unknown. Our secrecy rate formula with artificial noise (7) is more complicated than the one without artificial noise in [13, (4) ], and the method in [13] does not apply to our scheme. Thus we develop new approaches based on our Theorem 2 to prove the monotonically increasing property of the secrecy rate (7) with respect to the transmit power.
IV. THE ITERATIVE ALGORITHM FOR POWER

ALLOCATIONS BETWEEN SIGNAL AND GENERALIZED ARTIFICIAL NOISE
Although we have simplified the optimization problem in (7) as (10), which is a non-convex stochastic optimization problem, it is still difficult to analytically solve the optimal power allocation P U , P V s , and P V r in (10) . Thus in this section we propose an iterative power allocation algorithm summarized in Table I , which can find solutions almost the same as the brute-force search. However, the complexity of the proposed algorithm is much lower than the one based on brute-force search, such as [11] . More specifically, the brute force search requires searching on a plane simultaneously for the three variables P U , P V s , and P V r . However, the proposed algorithm divides the search into two simple sub-problems each needs much less complexity than the brute-force one. Before introducing the iterative algorithm, we first provide a useful result in Theorem 4 to test the optimality of power allocation found by the proposed algorithm.
First define
where E k (x) is the En-function [24] . With the proof given in the Appendix, we then have Theorem 4. The necessary condition for the power allocation (P U , P V s , P V r ) to be optimal for (10) is that if (16) is met, then (17) must also be met under the requirement P V s > 0.
Note that (16) and (17) are shown in the beginning of the next page. Now we present the derivation of the proposed iterative algorithm. The key idea of the proposed algorithm is as following. To prevent the high complexity of simultaneously solving P U , P V s , and P V r , we try to divide the problem as smaller ones and we can simply use the bisection method to solve them. More specifically, by eliminating the Lagrange multipliers in the KKT conditions, we form two equations such that each has different variables to be solved. Then through iteratively solving these two equations, we can find the power allocation. Denote the Lagrangian of (10) as L 2 with Lagrange multipliers λ, µ ≥ 0, µ 1 ≥ 0, and µ 2 ≥ 0, by the KKT conditions of (10), we then have (18), (19) , (20) , and
where p (P U , P V s , P V r ), and p * is the optimal solution of p. Assume that P * U , P * V s , and P * V r are all non-zeros. Combining (18), (19) , (21) , and (22) we have
Similarly, combining (18), (20) , (21) , and (23), and using the fact that 
MESSAGE-BEARING SIGNAL AND GENERALIZED ARTIFICIAL NOISE
Step 1
Set i = 0, P (0) Vs = 0, P (0) Vr = P T , and initialize the search region for the bisection method.
Step 2
Given P (i) Vs and the total power constraint (11), find P Vr > P (i) Vs (and thus P U = P T − (n T − 1)P Vr − P
Step 3
Given P since the channel gain of each antenna is i.i.d., we have
For the ith iteration, given P (i) V s , we can find the new (P U , P V r ) from f 2 (P U , P (i) V s , P V r ) = 0 as shown in (26) . By setting P U = (P T − P V r − P (i) V s )/(n T − 1), f 2 (P U , P V s , P V r ) becomes a function with only one variable P V r . Denote the resulted P V r as P (i+1) V r . Then given P (i+1) V r , we can also numerically solve a new P V s from f 1 (P V s , P (i+1) V r )=0 according to (24) . We let the resulted
which can be used in the (i + 1)th iteration and the iterative algorithm follows. Note that the bisection method can be used to perform the numerical search of P V s and P V r , which costs much less complexity than directly full search for optimizing (3) . Based on the concept described above, we explain each step in Table I in detail. First, numerically finding the tuple (P V s , P V r , P U ) which exactly meets the equality (24) and (26) is difficult. Therefore we relax (24) and (26) by inequalities
respectively, where ε 1 is a predefined small constant. Once the values found by the bisection search validate the above inequalities, they are treated as the solutions of these inequalities. Together with the iteration steps described in the end of the previous paragraph, we obtain Step 2 and 3 in Table I . Second, relaxing equalities (24) and (26) to inequalities (27) makes the solutions depend on ε 1 and may not satisfy the KKT conditions. Thus as in Step 4 of Table I , we substitute
, where
the analytical results into Theorem 4 to verify the optimality of the solutions. Finally, the initial values for the first iteration in Step 1 are obtained as follows. Note that two initial values are needed for specifying the search region of the bisection method. For initializing the bisection method used in Step 2, the two initial values for solving P V r ] for f 2 and f 1 , respectively. If the maximum of f 2 (P U , P
V s ] is still negative, we know that there does not exist any P 
From the numerical results in the next section, we can find that solutions found by the proposed iterative algorithm converge to those from the exhaustive full search. The intuition of the convergence is provided in the following. From numerical results we observe the two properties for the intermediate power allocation values of the ith iteration in Table I . Table I . Table I . Now start from our initial values in Step 1 P (0) V s = 0 and P (0) V r = P T . Since the bisection method is used in Step 2, with i=0 and these initial values, we get P
V r due to the bisection property. Then from Property 2, for Step 3 with i=0, since P
V r , and so on. Thus we know that our algorithm will converge to a pair (P * V s , P * V r ) until our stopping criterion is met. Here we also show the advantage of the proposed algorithm in complexity. The cumbersome full search will visit O(N 2 ) points, where N is the number of points searched by full search for each power allocation. Note that although there are three variables to be searched, with the total power constraint, only two of them need to be searched. On the contrary, our algorithm only visits K · O(log N) points where K is the number of iterations. Typically K N, and our algorithm has much lower complexity compared with the cumbersome full search. Indeed, from our simulation results in the next section, our iterative algorithm converges typically in three to four iterations and thus K is very small. Remark 1: Note that in Section IV we assume that P U , P V s , and P V r are all non-zeros to eliminate the multipliers. For channel conditions under which low rank covariance matrix of artificial noise is optimal, the proposed algorithm may have P V s converge to a value approximate zero. When this value is smaller than a predefined threshold ε 2 , we claim that P V s = 0 is optimal. V. NUMERICAL RESULTS In this section, we illustrate the performance gain of the proposed transmission scheme over Goel and Negi's. If not particularly specified, 2 by 1 by 1 channels are used as examples, with unit variance of each element of the eavesdropper channel g and the noise variances at Bob and Eve normalized to unity. From (10) we know that the rate R GAN only depends on the norm of the legitimate channel. Therefore, in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 , we use ||h|| 2 = 1.1 and 0.2 respectively to indicate different channel conditions in the numerical simulation. For each ||h|| 2 , we consider two cases where the variance σ 2 g of the eavesdropper channel g ∼ CN(0, σ 2 g I n T ) is 1 and 7.2. The cases with σ 2 g = 7.2 are to illustrate the near eavesdropper scenarios. The near eavesdropper scenario is an important application of information-theoretic secrecy where the variance of the channel from the transmitter to the eavesdropper is large. From Fig. 1 and 2 , the non-zero secrecy rate region is enlarged compared with Goel and Negi's. Moreover, the gain of our generalized artificial noise is further enhanced when the Eve's channel condition is good relative to the main channel such as smaller |h| 2 (consistent with the results in the singleantenna case [14] ) or larger variance for the eavesdropper channel (nearer eavesdropper). This is because the attack of the additional artificial noise (in signal space) to Eve is more effective in these cases. Also we can find that P V s and P V r are not all zeros, thus the rate without generalized artificial noise in [13] is strictly suboptimal.
In Fig. 1 and 2, we also compare the rates found by searching the optimal power allocations of (10) exhaustively and by the proposed iterative algorithm, respectively. For the iterative algorithm in Table I , we set δ = 10 −5 and ε 1 = ε 2 = 10 −5 . From Fig. 1 and 2 . The power allocations found by the proposed iterative algorithm indeed converge to those found by the exhaustive full search, and the secrecy rates from the proposed iterative algorithm match those from the full search. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 we show the rate ratio (secrecy rate with generalized artificial noise over secrecy rate with Goel and Negi's artificial noise) versus the number of iterations with ||h|| 2 = 0.1 and ||h|| 2 = 0.5 under different P T , respectively. In the setting of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , the secrecy rates from the proposed algorithms also match those from the full search, and thus we do not differentiate them. From these figures it can be easily seen that the proposed generalized artificial noise can provide moderate to tremendous (infinity) rate ratio improvement, depending on the transmit power. When the transmit power is lower, the generalized artificial noise provides more gain since the received signal of the main channel is weaker. We can also observe that our algorithm converges very fast in about three to four steps. As for the non-zero rate regions, they are enlarged by about 5 and 12 dB for the settings in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , respectively. We then show the secrecy rates under different numbers of transmit antenna in Fig. 5 . In this figure, we choose |h| 2 = 0.03 and each element of the vector eavesdropper channel g has unit variance. We can observe that the gain of our generalized artificial noise over Goel and Negi's artificial noise is more significant when the number of antenna is smaller. The insight is as follows. For Goel and Negi's "null-space only" artificial noise, the spatial diversity is only n T − 1 where n T is the number of the transmit antenna, while the full spatial diversity n T is provided by our generalized artificial noise. Thus our generalized artificial noise has less probability to be faded out by the random channels. And this spatial diversity gain (n T versus n T − 1) is more significant when n T is smaller.
To illustrate the optimal power allocation among P U , P V s , and P V r , in Fig. 6 we use ||h|| 2 = 0.2 as an example, where the numerical full search is performed. It can be easily seen that as the receive SNR decreases, more power should be allocated to P V s , that is the artificial noise in the signal direction. On the other hand, when the receive SNR increases, P V s decreases to zero.
As a final remark, we have compared the rate of the proposed scheme to that with full search of channel input covariance matrix of a simple 2 by 1 by 1 case. For example, when |h| 2 = 1.1, σ 2 g = 1 under both P T = 1 and P T = 2, we can find that the ergodic secrecy rates are almost the same as 0.252 and 0.51 bits/channel use, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we generalized Goel and Negi's artificial noise [11] for fast fading secure transmission with full CSIT of the legitimate channel and only the statistical CSIT of the eavesdropper's channel. Contrary to [11] where only null space of the legitimate channel is allowed for artificial noise, our generalized artificial noise can be transmitted in any directions. For the MISOSE wiretap channel, we showed that the complicated joint secrecy rate optimization problem over covariance matrices of message-bearing signal and generalized artificial noise could be simplified to a power allocation problem with only three scalar variables. We also developed an algorithm to efficiently solve the non-convex power allocation problem, whose complexity is much lower than the bruteforce one in [11] . Through the numerical results, we verified that the optimized generalized artificial noise outperforms the heuristic artificial noise selection in [11] under various channel conditions, especially when the legitimate channel is poor or the near eavesdropper scenario.
VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
In this proof we focus on (7) and provide a general result which is valid without any assumptions on U and V. Although the secrecy rate optimization problem (7) is non-convex in general, we can still use the KKT conditions [25] to find the necessary conditions for the optimal solutions. Define the Lagrangian as
where ψ ψ ψ u , ψ ψ ψ v , λ ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers accounting for the total power constraint and the constraints that S u and S v are positive semidefinite, respectively, then the KKT conditions are
and
with a * (a * )
By left and right multiplying S * u to (28) , with (30), we know that
where D A * and D u * are the diagonal matrices composed by eigenvalues of A * and S * u , respectively. Due to the fact that tr(S * u ) = 0 results in R GAN = 0, we only consider the case tr(S * u ) > 0 in the following. Thus from (37) we have λ = tr(A * S * u )/tr (S * u ). Now we investigate the properties of the eigenvalues of A * , which will be crucial to proving this theorem. First, note that A * a * (a * ) H + E [M * ] meets the form of the interlacing theorem in Lemma 1. Then we can use Lemma 1 to show that all eigenvalues of A * are negative except for the largest one, i.e.,
where the first inequality in (38) comes from letting k = n T − 2 in (8) 
We will show that λ in (37) is positive when R GAN in (7) is positive, and then together with (39) and (37) this theorem will be proved. First, from (35),
note that tr (M * S * u ) is a random variable since g is a random vector. Now if R GAN in (7) is positive, then
, and from [13, Lemma 8],
From (40) and (41), the above inequality becomes 1 − tr a * (a * ) H S *
if R GAN > 0. Then λ = tr(A * S * u )/tr (S * u ) > 0 if R GAN > 0, i.e., tr (S * u ) > 0. Note from [26] we know that λ is also the largest eigenvalue of A * . Then, to meet (37) with (39) and λ > 0 if R GAN > 0, the eigenvalues of S * u corresponding to negative eigenvalues of A * must be all zeros. Thus S * u is rank one, if R GAN > 0. The case where R GAN = 0 can always be achieved when there is no signal transmission which also satisfies our claim.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: The KKT conditions of the new problem are the same as (28)-(33) in AppendixVII-A, except that ψ ψ ψ v 0 and S * v 0 in (33) are replaced by ψ ψ ψ v = 0 and S * v 0, respectively. From these KKT conditions, we have the following necessary condition for the optimal S * v and S * u as
where B * is given in (36). We will prove (9) by showing that S * u B * S * v = 0 and S * v B * S * u = 0. To show S * u B * S * v = 0, we first substitute (29) in (28) (both in AppendixVII-A) as
Then we left and right multiply the above equation by S * u and S * v and have
Simplifying the above equation by (30) and (31), and then we have S * u B * S * v = 0. The fact that S * v B * S * u = 0 is obtained similarly by left and right multiplying (44) by S * v and S * u , respectively. Then (9) is valid.
Also from (28) and (30), we know that S * u A = AS * u . Using this fact and (45),
Now from (29) and (31),
From (46) and (47), we know that S * u and S * v have the same eigenvectors and commute.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Since the optimal S u is unit rank and the assumption that S v has one eigenvector common with u 1 , we can expand (9) as
where the first equality is from the definition h 2 U H h and the fact that g and Ug have the same distribution due to g is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random vector. The second equality is from the second equality in (9) . Now we first verify the conditions of U such that the equality in (49) is held. From [13, Lemma 4] we know that
is diagonal, and the fact that multiplications of diagonal matrices commute, thus we only need to consider
Recall that S * u is unit rank. Without loss of generality, we let
}. Then (50) can be further represented by
where h 2k is the kth entry of h 2 . Note that h 21 should not be zero, otherwise h H S * u h = 0 which results in a zero secrecy rate. Therefore, h 22 = h 23 = ··· = h 2n T = 0, from which it can easily be seen that the only one KKT solution is that U = [h/||h||, (h/||h||) ⊥ ]. Based on the assumption that one eigenvector of S v is parallel to the beamformer of the message bearing signal, we know that both U and V have eigenvectors in the direction h/||h||.
D. Proof of Lemma 2
Now we focus on the optimization problem (13), but replacing (14) with equality since we have proved that the optimal solution always happens when the equality in (14) holds. We will show that the equal power allocation is optimal for this problem, that is, P V r = P V 2 = ··· = P V n T . By renaming P V 1 in (13) as P V s , we transform (13) as
where f (x) log (a + x) − log(b + x) with constants a 1 + g 1 P V s and b 1 + g 1 (P U + P V s ), and variable x = n T ∑ i=2G i P V i . We will show that given g 1 , the optimal power allocation maximizing EG
. This power allocation is also optimal for (52) since the transmitter does not know the realization ofG 1 = g 1 . Therefore, we want
(54) Here we introduce some results from the stochastic ordering theory [23] to prove the desired result. 
The reasons are that x > 0, and that when P U > 0 (R GAN > 0), b > a > 0 by the definitions of a and b under (53 (56) To show the above is nonnegative, we resort to the majorization theory [28] . Note that ∑ n T k=2 log(1 +P V k s) is a Schurconcave function in (P V 2 ,...,P V n T ), ∀s > 0, and by the definition of majorization
we know that the RHS of (56) is nonnegative, ∀s > 0. Then (54) is valid. From above, we can set
and apply the fact hh H ||h|| 2 + h ||h|| ⊥ h ||h|| ⊥ H = I n T to Theorem 2, then this Lemma is proved.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
We first introduce the following lemma which will be used in proving Theorem 4.
Lemma
4. With D u = diag(P U , 0,... ,0) and D v = diag(P V s , P V r ,... ,P V r ), then the diagonal matrix
Proof: From the proof of [13, Lemma 4], we first rewrite the diagonal terms of Y in the following integrals as,
for i = 2, 3,...,n T . Also from [13, Lemma 4], we know that Y i, j = 0 for i = j. Therefore, we know that Y is a diagonal matrix and each diagonal entry from the above is larger than zero, which completes the proof.
We now provide the proof of Theorem 4. From the KKT condition of (7) which takes the first derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to S v , with U = V, we have
Similar to (37), we have
where D C and D * v are the diagonal matrices composed by eigenvalues of C and S * v , respectively. From (63), the necessary condition for D * v to be optimal with P * V s > 0 is that when tr(CS * v ) > 0, C does not have any negative eigenvalues; or, when tr(CS * v ) < 0, C does not have any positive eigenvalues. Next, we will find when this property will hold. Now we check the eigenvalues of C if tr(CS * v ) > 0. From [13, Lemma 5] , all eigenvalues of C are positive implies l(0) > 0, where
Note that l(λ) is a strictly increasing function when λ > 0. By Lemma 4 we know UYU H −1 exists. Then we can expand l(0) > 0 from (64) as
After substituting c from (61) into (65), and using the fact that the optimal U = [h/||h||, (h/||h||) ⊥ ] from Theorem 2 and Y is invertible from Lemma 4, we have
Then by the definition of Y in Lemma 4 and explicitly calculate the expectation, Y 1,1 equals to the left-hand-side (LHS) of (17). Then the ">" part in (17) comes from the above inequality. In addition, tr(CS * v ) > 0 implies
After some arrangement, the LHS of (66) can be represented by the LHS of (16), and the ">" part of (16) is valid. The case where tr(CS * v ) < 0 can be derived similarly, which results in the "<" parts in (16) and (17) .
